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1961]

COMMENTS

ADVERSE COMMENTS BY A FLORIDA PROSECUTOR
UPON A DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY
It may be stated as a general principle of criminal jurisprudence that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor shall his refusal to be a witness serve to create adverse inferences
or presumptions in the minds of the jury.'
This principle of law is not easy to understand or apply. Its ramifications and overtones have echoed through our legal system for over eight
hundred years, periodically causing twinges of uncertainty in the minds of
law-makers, legal writers and jurists. To understand -better the intricacies
and inconsistencies of this privilege of "standing mute,,' a brief review of
2
its development would be helpful.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE

In an attempt to avert a situation threatening to economically and
morally weaken English litigants, the dangerous and expensive "trial by
combat" and the "trial by ordeal" were replaced by the "trial by compurgation" wherein the party took an oath, accompanied by his oathhelpers, and upon'the successful pronouncement of a ritualistic formula,
received the decision. While this procedure alleviated the high costs of
"litigation" experienced under the former procedure, it did not necessarily
result in justice between the parties. In 1236 the ecclesiastical courts in
England, acting apart from the "common-law" courts, replaced it by a new
procedure wherein a party would be required to answer specific questios
asked him by the judge under an oath to speak only the truth. This
inquisitional procedure was adopted by the courts of High Commission
and the Star Chamber who used it with effectiveness in ex officio proceedings
dealing with heresy, sedition, and witch-hunting.
In 1637, John Lilbum was formally charged in the Star Chamber
with printing heretical books. Upon his refusal to take the oath, he was
whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take a legal oath"
without which many offenses might go "undiscovered and unpunished."
Three years later he complained to Parliament of his treatment. Four years
subsequent to his complaint, the House of Lords set aside his conviction,
"it being contrary to the laws of God, nature and the Kingdom, for any

1. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 120-136 (1954) (hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK).
2. To avoid a painful succession of individual footnotes referring to the same
authority, may this writer point out to all those who express interest and curiosity
in the development of the privilege against self-incrimination the same impressive and
comprehensive authority relied upon by this writer for the material contained in the
immediately following sections-8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250, 2251 (3d ed. 1940)
(hereinafter cited as 8 WICMORE).
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man to be his own accuser."'3 That year the courts of High Commission
and Star Chamber were abolished, and all ecclesiastical courts were forbidden
to administer any oath, ex officio or otherwise, whereby the party might
be obliged to become his own accuser.
While the Lilburn case did not immediately affect the practice of
the common law courts of examining the persons charged with crimes,
by the early 1700's the principle was accepted that in all proceedings,
civil or criminal, not only parties but also witnesses were privileged against
compulsion to testify to facts subjecting them to punishment or forfeiture.
The principle of the privilege against self-incrimination found early recognition in the American colonies, and was incorporated in the federal
constitution as well as in the constitutions of several of the states before
4
the end of the 1700's.
At common law, the criminal defendant, as an interested party, was
considered incompetent as a witness. He could neither be called by the
government nor could he testify in his own behalf. That rule of incompetency existed until the mid-1800's at which time it gave way to statutory
emancipation of such disability. 5 In light of the prevalent constitutional
prohibitions against forcing a defendant in a criminal case to testify, these
emancipatory statutes enacted in each state permitted but did not require
the accused to testify, 6 thereby giving the accused an option to testify voluntarily or stand mute.
This situation gave rise to a new problem: since the accused was
permitted to be a witness, would his refusal to take that opportunity to
deny the accusations against him give reason for the jury to infer his
guilt?7 Furthermore, would the inference arising from the defendant's
failure to testify tend to force him to become a witness in contravention of
the constitutional privilege? Answering these questions in the affirmative,
the legislatures in the majority of the states8 and Congress in respect to
the federal courts, 9 enacted provisions, in varying forms, operating to
prevent comment by the prosecuting officer upon the criminal defendant's
refusal to become a witness.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE IN FLORIDA

The Florida Constitution of 1865 affirmed the existence of the privilege
against self-incrimination by stating, "No person shall be subject to be
3. Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. (1637-1645), summarized in 8 WiGMORE at
p. 291. It is of great interest to note that Lilburn objected to the "ex officio" proceedings,
but he never contended that he did not have to testify against himself. The distinction
between "accusing" yourself and "testifying against" yourself had been overlooked by
the courts, and eventually was entirely ignored.
4. See, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
5. 2 WIGMORE § 488 (containing an exhaustive study of statutory provisions
respecting the qualifications of witnesses).

6. Ibid.

7. See, e.g., Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213 (1871).
8. 2 WicmoRE § 488.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1958).
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twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ."0 At the time this constitution
was enacted, the specific prohibition against compelling an accused person
to be a witness served no apparent purpose, since the criminal defendant
under the common law disability of incompetency as an interested party
could not be a witness in any instance.
In 1892 the state legislature granted to criminal defendants the right
to make a sworn statement to the jury "of the matter of his defense or
her defense."" While the statute was an improvement over the absolute
common law disability, it left much to be desired. Yet, it must be admitted
that it permitted the defendant an advantage not available to him under
our modern procedure; the defendant could have made a statement to
the jury concerning the facts in issue, and he was not subject to crossexamination by the prosecuting officer.
In 1895 the Florida legislature amended the rights granted the accused
under the 1892 law adding:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be
sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and shall in such case be
subject to examination as other witnesses, but no accused person
shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall any
prosecuting attorney be permitted before the court or jury to
comment
on the failure of the accused to testify in his own
12
behalf.
In one concise statement, Florida removed the common law disability
of an accused person as a witness, reaffirmed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and sought to guarantee the defendant freedom
from indirect pressures compelling his testimony. The latter was accomplished by forbidding the prosecuting officer from commenting in such
a way as to foster unfavorable inferences in the minds of the jurors
concerning the accused's refusal to become a witness to deny the accusations
against him.
One of the first Florida cases construing the 1895 statute was Gray
v. State,'3 wherein the prosecuting officer in his closing argument stated:
Gentlemen of the jury, the evidence as it stands before you,
unexplained and uncontradicted, although it does not point positively to this
defendant, is sufficient to warrant you in finding
4
him guilty.'
10.
11.

12.

FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RicHTS § 12 (Emphasis added.)
LAWS OF FLORIDA ch. 2908 (1892).
LAWS OF FLORIDA ch. 4400 (1895)
(the statute has

remained essentially

unchanged, except that the right to the opening and closing argument preserved to
the defendant Who offers no testimony other than his own has been added, as seen
in FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1959)).
13. 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53 (1900).
14. Id. at 176, 28 So. at 53 (Emphasis added.)
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Referring to the legislative prohibition against comments, as contained
in the 1895 law, the court observed that:
[T]he policy of the statute should not be violated, either
directly or indirectly. The statute does not, of course, prohibit
legitimate comment on testimony properly before the jury, and,
in our opinion, the language used ...cannot strictly be regarded
as a comment upon the failure of the accused to testify in his own
behalf.... We think the prosecuting officer could comment on the
evidence as it existed before the jury, avoiding any reference to
the failure of the defendant
himself to explain or contradict what
5
had been introduced.'

This decision served to delineate the problem arising from the uncertain
boundaries between the "no-comment" privilege of the accused and the
traditional right of the prosecuting officer to .characterize and comment
upon the evidence properly introduced before the jury.
The next opportunity given the Florida Supreme Court to interpret
further the extent of the "no-comment" privilege arose in Jackson v.
State 6 in which the prosecutor said, "There was no denial of that
accusation, and there is none now." The trial court sustained an objection
to the words "and there is none now." The prosecuting attorney, disclaiming any intention of referring to the defendant's failure to testify, and
against the objection of defense counsel, was permitted to say to the jury:
I do not mean for one moment to contend before you that I have
the right to argue to you that you should convict this defendant
because he has not seen fit to become a witness in his own behalf...
how in the next breath could I have meant to convey to your minds
that you, were to be prejudiced against this defendant, or that
you were to find him guilty or even to consider it as
an element
17
of guilt that he did not go upon the witness stand?
The supreme court held the reference to the lack of testimony to constitute reversible error, regardlessof the prosecutor's good faith in negating any
misconceptions as to his intent or purpose. In so holding the court said
that, "The prohibition of the statute is not limited to philippics against
the prisoner based upon his failure to testify, but extends to any comment
8
upon such failure."'
In Sykes v. State,'9 the defendant was sworn as a witness and testified
solely to the effect that when he and the codefendant were arrested at a
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 177, 28 So. at 54 (Emphasis added.)
45 Fla. 38, 34 So. 243 (1903).
Id. at 39, 34 So. at 243.
However, after holding that the intent of the prosecutor in making reference

to the failure of the accused to testify is irrelevant, the court recognized that references
may be made in such form so as not to constitute reversible error, as in State v. Mosley,

31 Kan. 355, 2 Pac. 782 (1884). Since that case turned upon the prosecutor's lack
of intent in referring to the failure of the defendant to testify, it seems rather
contradictory of the holding of the instant case.
19. 78 Fla. 167, 82 So. 778 (1919), overruled by Odom v. State, 109 So.2d
163 (Fla. 1959).
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certain hotel he had no room there, nor had he ever lived there. The
prosecuting officer made the following comment:
From the evidence which the state has, I expected the defendant,
he being a young man, to come before the court and admit to you
gentlemen the whole case, and tell you the truth that he took the
car, and that 20he is a young man, and throw himself on the mercy
of the court.
Upon objection, the trial court refused to instruct the jury to disregard
such argument. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held the prosecutor's
comment to be a violation of the "no-comment" privilege. Emphasizing
that the defendant did not testify in his own behalf other than denying
that he had a room at the hotel where he was arrested, the court said:
To permit the counsel for the state to comment upon this failure
of the defendant to explain his possession of the car or to testify
fully in his own behalf violated the spirit and letter of the statute,
and should have been excluded from consideration by the21 jury
on the court's instruction when requested by the defendant.
The court cited no cases as authority for its decision, nor did the court
include any consideration of the propriety of the prosecutor's remarks
'
'Acinei 'vieWed 'srle'y its"an, e Wdni"cie "'&s-b ....... 01 "
The year 1924 saw one of the broadest constructions of the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination in Florida. In Rowe v. State,23 while
prosecuting a first degree murder case, the Assistant State Attorney characterized the indictment as, "There being nothing to deny it, not even the
statement of the defendants themselves." Upon objection, the court said:
Gentlemen of the jury, you will not regard that portion of the
argument in reference to the statements of the defendants themselves. Of course, Mr. McNeill, you realize24 you cannot comment
on the failure of the defendants to testify.
Mr. McNeill replied, "Oh, yes. I had no intention in the world of commenting on that."
After referring to other comments made by the state alluding to the
defendant's failure to testify, the Florida Supreme Court held such
comments to be incurable; that since instructions to the jury to disregard
the prejudicial comments could not correct the damage done, reversible
error occurred immediately upon the utterance of the prohibited comment.
Quoting its previous ruling in Akin v. State25 on the effect of improper
remarks to the' jury, the court said:
.20. Id. at 172, 82 So. at 781.

21. Ibid.
22. The court apparently construed the term "witness" to be predicated upon the
materiality of the testimony given.
23. 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924).
24. Id. at 21 98 So at 615.
25. 86 Fla. 564, 98 So. 609 (1923).
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The law seems to be well settled that it is the duty of the
trial judge, whether requested or not, to check improper remarks
of counsel to the jury, and to seek by proper instructions to the
jury to remove any prejudicial effect they may be calculated to
have against the opposite party. A verdict will not be set aside
by an appellate court because of such remarks or because of any
omission of the judge to perform his duty in the matter, unless
objection be made at the time of their utterance. This rule is
subject to the exception that, if the improper remarks are of such
character that neither rebuke or retraction may entirely destroy
their sinister influence, in such event a new trial26should be awarded
regardless of the want of objection or exception.
The court continued by stating:
We hold that calling the attention of the jury by the
prosecuting officer of the state, to the failure of the accused to
testify in his own behalf, it matters not how adroitly he may
attempt to evade the command of the statute, or how innocently
it may be done, comes within the exception and deprives the
defendant of the protection the statute was intended to secure,27
and of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.
The weight of authouity in the United States seems to be that
comments of the prosecuting attorney on the failure of the accused to
testify stand on very much the same footing as other improper argument.
Whether they call for a reversal or :not depends upon a full consideration
of all circumstances, including the action of the judge at the time the
comment was made, whether he promptly intervened, ordered the comment stricken and admonished the jury to disregard them. 28 By this
decision in the Rowe case, the highest court of Florida has aligned itself
with the minority rule which holds such remarks made in violation of
the statute to be so prejudicial as to be incurable by instructions to
29
the jury.

26. Id. at 572, 98 So. at 612 (Emphasis added.)
27. The court's apparent intention to prohibit any and all comments which may
convey to the jury the reminder of the defendant's failure to testify was manifested by
the court's quotation in the Rowe opinion of statements made by the following
jurisdictions: Jordan v. State, 29 Tex. App. 595, 16 S.W. 543 (1891); Hunt v. State,
28 Tex. App. 149, 12 S.W. 737 (1889) (statute "is to absolutely inhibit allusion by
counsel to the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf; and that the inhibition
is so far mandatory that its violation by a prosecuting counsel will work the reversal
of a conviction, although he may have been provoked thereto by the argument of
counsel for the defense, and although the court may have sought, by admonition and by
instructions to the jury, to control the effect of the same."); Reddick v. State. 72 Miss.
1008, 16 So. 490 (1895) (intention is immaterial); Quinn v. People, 123 Ill. 333, 15
N.E. 46 (1888) (Instructions to jury that remarks are improper is insufficient. "How
much did it avail for the court to tell the jury that the remarks of counsel were
improper . . . ? As well might one attempt to brush off with the hand a stain of
ink from a piece of white linen.")
28. Annot., 84 A.L.R. 784, 795 (1933).
29. Id. at 799.
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The next case serving to confuse further the scope of the "no-comment"
privilege was Dabney v. State30 wherein Justice Buford, speaking for the
court, recognized the rule, but added that:
[I]f a defendant voluntarily takes the stand and testifies as a
witness in his own behalf, then he becomes subject to crossexamination as any other witness, and the prosecuting officer
has the right to comment on his testimony, his manner and
demeanor on the stand, the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of his statements, and on the discrepancies which may appear in
his testimony to the same extent as 31would be proper with reference
to testimony of any other witness.
No mention appears in the opinion of the direct conflict created between
this case and the Sykes3 2 case. In both Sykes and Dabney the defendants
testified to substantially the same degree, yet different results appeared
in each case. However, the Dabney decision appears to be more consistent
33
with the majority view.
The next case dealing with the "no-comment" rule was Waid v. State 4
wherein it was held that when the defense counsel comments on his
client's lack of testimony and the reason for it, he invites rebuttal by
the prosecuting attorney. Any remarks included as such rebuttal concerning
the defendant's failure to testify would not constitute reversible error.
Charles Way's alleged partiality towards outboard motors eventually
led to his appeal in Way v. State 5 from a conviction of grand larceny.
At the trial, the defense attorney initially objected to the county solicitor's
argument wherein the solicitor said, "At the outset, Mr. Warfield [defense
counsel] gave no explanation of his defense-." The court stated to the
solicitor, "Make no comment on their failure to testify." Subsequently,
the county solicitor said in his argument that:
Mr. Cessna [a witness] said he saw it was an outboard motor
and that boat left the beach from in front of Charles Way's house
and that evidence that he left the beach from in front of his
house is unexplained. There is no denial of it. There is no conflict. 36
Remarking that it had little doubt that the average juror would
consider the statement made by the county solicitor as a direct reference to
the defendant's failure to testify, the Florida Supreme Court was of the view
that "such statement was at least a comment, covertly if not directly"
and ordered a new trial. The court also disposed of the Attorney General's
30. 119 Fla. 341, 161 So. 380 (1935).
31. Id. at 343, 161 So. at 381.
32. Sykes v. State, 78 Fla. 167, 82 So. 778 (1919).
33. Annot., 68 A.L.R. 1108, 1162 (1930). In Odom v. State, 109 So.2d 163
(Fla. 1959), the court settled the conflict in favor of the Dabney ruling and overruled
the Sykes case.

34. 58 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1952).
35. 67 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1953). Compare the substance of the comments in this
case with the comments made in Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389 (1908).
36. Id. at 322 (Emphasis not supplied.)
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contention that the Harmless Error Statute 37 should be invoked. The court
found as a matter of first impression, that the statute was inapplicable
where it was demonstrated that the '"no-comment" statute had been
88
violated.
After living with the Florida "no-comment" statute for over half a
century, the Florida Supreme Court in Gordon v. State" strongly implied
its displeasure with that legislative mandate. At the trial, the comment
was made that "they didn't testify to what happened. . . ." On appeal,
the court found (rather regretfully it seems) that the prosecutor violated
the defendant's rights to the extent that a new trial was required. In so
holding, the court added:
Whether we as judges deem the rule to be vise and salutary
is of no consequence at all and we assume no responsibility for it.
The Legislature made the rule and we must follow it, at least
until the Legislature changes it. . . . We are not endowed with
the privilege of doing otherwise
regardless of the view which we
might have as individuals. 41
The attitude of the supreme court, as exhibited in the above case,
was not visibly reflected by the District Court of Appeal in McLendon
v. State.42 In this case, the prosecuting attorney said to the jury, in
referring to testimony relating to a conversation at the scene of the
arrest, where a co-defendant pointed to the defendant McLendon and
said that McLendon carried the lottery bankroll:
If -you feel that either of us are in error on quoting the
evidence, you have the right, later on, to request to hear the
testimony of any witness, that you didn't understand. What would
you have done under those circumstances? Would you have made
a remark 'I've been framed, if I'd known this bag and balls was
in the house, I wouldn't have been here tonight?' Is that the
remark of an innocent person who knows nothing at all about
this? . . .And if another man there with you, whom you may
or may not know said 'What is the use, he carries the payroll,'
and if the officer searched you and found loose in your pocket,
not in. your wallet, but in your pockets, some seven hundred and
some odd dollars, what would you say? What did he say-nothing.43
Taking into consideration the fact that the appellant neither testified
nor offered any witnesses, and pointing to the long line of Florida
decisions on the subject culminating with the Gordon case, the court
remanded the case for a new trial. The court strictly adhered to the
construction that a comment by a prosecuting attorney, directly or
indirectly, which is subject to interpretation by a jury as a comment
37.

FLA. STAT.

§ 54.23 (1959).

38. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1959).
39. 104 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1958).
40. Id. at 540.

41. Id. at 541.

42. 105 So2d 513 (Fa.App. 1958).
43. Id. at 514 (Emphasis added.)
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upon the failure of the accused to testify, is an encroachment upon the
rights of the defendant, notwithstanding that such comment is susceptible
to a different construction.44 In effect, the court seemed to say that unless
it appears certain that the language of the prosecutor was not subject
to the prohibited interpretation, then the court will find reversible error.
Ard v. State45 raised an interesting question concerning the burden
placed upon a possessor of stolen property to explain the circumstances
of such possession. In his argument to the jury, the county solicitor
stated:
Another rule of law that the Court will charge you on is this.
When you are found in possession of stolen property, then the
Burden becomes on you, the burden is on you to make a
reasonable explanation of how you got it, and if no explanation
is forthcoming that you find reasonable then the law is that the
Jury has the right to bring in a verdict of guilty on that fact
a person found in possession of stolen property. Now, like I
pointed out to you, that is undenied here that this property was
stolen, and it is. undenied that this defendant moved two cartons
of cigarettes. .. . . [T]he burden is on the State to prove the
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That is true, but
it is also the law that when a defendant is found in possession of
stolen property the burden then shifts to him to give a reasonable
explanation of how he got into it. I dsk you today if a reasonable
explanation has been forthcoming.4 6
In finding reversible error, the court explained that the "burden" on
the defendant to explain is not an obligation to testify in court. The
"explanation" or "burden to explain" is usually in reference to an explanation at the time of arrest or discovery of such stolen property, such as an
innocent man would ordinarily make when faced with the embarrassing
discovery of being the proud possessor of "hot" merchandise.
Odom v. State47 represents the most recent decision substantially contributing to the "no-comment" rule. The defendant had voluntarily become
a witness in his own behalf, and was asked only three questions: his name,
age (18) and the highest grade he reached in school (7th grade). There
was no cross-examination. Although the supreme court found that the
prosecutor did comment on the defendant's failure to testify fully,48 the
44. The court was evidently referring to the italicized phrase in the quoted

statement of the prosecutor: "What did he say-nothing." It is capable of two

interpretations: (1) that the prosecutor meant to allude to the defendant's failure to
deny the accusation at the time of arrest, or (2) that the prosecutor meant to allude
to the defendant's failure to deny it at the time of trial.
45. 108 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1959).
46. Id. at 39.
47. 109 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1959).
48. At the trial, the court reporter made no record of the arguments of the
state attorney or the defense attorney, no request for such recording having been made.
Upon motion for a new trial, the comments were related by the reporter as well as
he could remember, and the record of the reporter's testimony was adopted by the
Attorney General and defense counsel for the purpose of the appeal.

302
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court did not consider it to be in error. The court characterized the
defendant's limited testimony as a strategy of defense to seek mercy because
of the defendant's tender age and lack of schooling. The court further
remarked that the case was similar to the Waid4 9 case, where that court held
that if counsel for the defense remarked to the jury upon the lack of
defendant's testimony and the reason for it, then the prosecutor could
comment upon it in rebuttal.
Counsel for the defense maintained that since the accused was -asked
only three questions, entirely innocuous in nature, the accused should be
sheltered as if he had not testified at all, as was done in the Sykes case.5 0
The court answered this by saying:
Were the contention accepted by this court, we would put
our imprimatur upon the procedure of asking a defendant just
enough questions to furnish an introduction to a plea for sympathy
or mercy, then reverse the judgment, because of the inhibition of
the statute, when sympathy or mercy had not been forthcoming.
We do not adopt the view and, furthermore, we do not think that
invocation of the statute depends on the quantity and quality of
the testimony of a defendant once he has become a witness for
himself. 51
The court, remarking on the defense counsel's reliance on the Sykes case,
found the Sykes opinion in conflict 52 with "many on the general subject"
and specifically in conflict with Dabney v. State.5 3 The court preferred to
adhere to Dabney and recede from Sykes. However, no other authority or
reasoning was given for the court's decision on this point.
THE "No-COMMENT"

RULE:

HELP OR HINDRANCE?

The cases discussed in the preceding section serve to reflect to a limited
degree the long-lived controversy existing in the United States today
concerning the relative advantages, disadvantages, logic or lack of logic
54
inherent in the "no-comment" rule.
Although many different theories, reasons and solutions have been
put forth over the years by legal writers, philosophers and jurists, the
following arguments represent what is believed by this writer to be the
basic arguments; basic both in respect to chronological formation and in
respect to logical development.
49. Waid v. State, note 34 supra.
50. Sykes v. State, note 19 supra.
51. Note 47 supra at 165, referring to FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1959) (that if the
defendant becomes a witness he should be subject to examination as any other witness).
52. See MCCORMICK § 26 (partial testimony waives privilege).
53. 119 Fla. 341, 161 So. 380 (1935).
54. For several excellent articles on the rationale behind the "no-comment" rule,

see: Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31
MICH. L. REv. 226 (1932); Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify,
31 MicH L. R.Ev. 40 (1932).
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ARGUMENTS

OPPOSED TO THE "NO-COMMENT"

RULE

In 1827, while in the process of a vigorous and painfully logical attack
upon the rationale used by the courts in excluding the criminal defendant's
compulsory testimony, the brilliant legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham
observed:
The essence of this reason is contained in the word 'hard'; 'tis
'hard' upon a man to be obliged to criminate himself. Hard it is
upon a man, it must be confessed, to be obliged to do anything
that he does not like. That he should not much like to do what
is meant by his criminating himself, is natural enough; for what
it leads to is his being punished. What is no less bard upon him
is that he should be punished: but did it ever occur to a man to
propose a general abolition of all punishments with this hardship
for a reason for it? Whatever hardship there is in a man's being
punished, that and no more, is there in his thus being made to
criminate himself. ..

.55

In 1871, the blunt logic of Bentham's argument was polished to a more
brilliant lustre by Chief Justice Appleton, an ardent disciple of Jeremy
Bentham, in State v. Cleaves:5 6
The statute authorizing the defendant in criminal proceedings,
at his own request, to testify, was passed for the benefit of the
innocent and for the protection of innocence.
The defendant, in criminal cases, is either innocent or guilty.
If innocent, he has every inducement to state the facts, which would
exonerate him. The truth would be his protection. There can
be no reason why he should withhold it, and every reason for
its utterance.
Being guilty, if a witness, a statement of the truth would lead
to his conviction, and justice would ensue. Being guilty, and
denying his guilt as a witness, an additional crime would be
committed, and the perils of a conviction for a new offence
incurred.
But the defendant, having the opportunity to contradict or
explain the inculpative facts proved against him, may decline to
avail himself of the opportunity thus afforded him by the law. His
declining to avail himself of the privilege of testifying is an existent
and obvious fact. It is a fact patent in the case. The jury cannot
avoid perceiving it. Why should they not regard it as a fact- of
more or less weight in determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused?
The silence of the accused, - the omission to explain or
contradict, when the evidence tends to establish guilt is a fact, the probative effect of which may vary according to the varying
conditions of the different trials in which it may occur, - which
the jury must perceive, and which perceiving they can no more
55. 7

BENTHAM,

RATIONALE

OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

56. 59 Me. 298, 300-301 (1871).

452 (Bowring's ed. 1827).
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disregard than one can the light of the sun, when shining with
full blaze on the open eye.
It has been urged that this view of law places the prisoner in
an embarrassed condition. Not so. The embarrassment of the
prisoner, if embarrassed, is the result of his own previous misconduct, not of the law. If innocent, he will regard the privilege of
testifying as a boon justly conceded. If guilty, it is optional with
the accused to testify or not, and he cannot complain of the election
he may make. If he does not avail himself of the privilege of
contradiction or explanation, it is his fault, if by his own misconduct
or crime he had placed himself in such a situation that he prefers
any inferences which may be drawn .from his refusal to testify,,
to those which must be drawn from his testimony, if truly delivered.
Despite the razor-like logical protestations of Bentham and Appleton,
the "no-comment" rule was granted almost universal affirmation by the
legislatures of the individual states of the union. 57 Whether this was the
result of a rational analysis of the relationship between proper evidentiary
material and the basic concepts of criminal jurisprudence, or whether it
was the result of an emotionally immature but well-meaning society is
disputable. Nevertheless, the tide seems to be turning about, and the
arguments in favor of the perpetuation of the "no-comment" privilege are
receiving closer inspection than ever before.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE "No-COMMENT"

RULE

The year in which Chief Justice Appleton of Maine delivered his
opinion in opposition to the "no-comment" privilege also bore witness to
the publication of Justice Allan's opinion in Ruloff v. People58 supporting
the privilege. Criminal defendants were not permitted to testify in New
York courts until 1869 when the common law disability was removed by
statute.59 In obvious mistrust of any statute allowing the defendant the
privilege of testifying as a witness, the court said through Justice Allan:
The act may be regarded as of doubtful propriety and many
regard it as unwise, and as subjecting a person on trial to a severe
if not cruel test. If sworn his testimony will be treated as of but
little value, will be subjected to those tests which detract from the
weight of evidence given under peculiar inducements to pervert the
truth when the truth would be unfavorable, and he will under the
law as now understood and interpreted, be subjected to the crossexamination of the prosecuting officer, and made to testify to any
and all matters relevant to the issue, or his own credibility and
character, and under pretense of impeaching him as a witness, all
the incidents of his life brought to bear with great force against
him. He will be examined under the embarrassments incident to
his position, depriving him of his self-possession and necessarily
57. 8

WIGMORE

§ 2272 n.2.

58. 45 N.Y. 213 (1871).
59. N.Y. Laws 1869, ch. 678.
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greatly interfering with his capacity to do himself and the truth
justice. . . . These embarrassments will more seriously affect
the innocent than the guilty and hardened in crime. Discreet
counsel will hesitate before advising a client charged with high
crimes to be a witness for himself, under all the disadvantages
surrounding him. If, with this statute in force, the fact that he is
not sworn can be used against him, and suspicion be made t6
assume the form and have the force of evidence, and circumstances,
however slightly tending to prove guilt, be made conclusive evidence
of the fact, then the individual is morally coerced, although not
actually compelled to be a witness against himself. The Constitution, which protects a party accused of crime from being a witness
against himself, will be practically abrogated.59a
This argument has received extensive approval.
The constitution of South Dakota specifies that, "No person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself." 60 In 1927
the legislature added to the-state code the provision:
[T]he person charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness, and his failure to testify in his own
behalf, is hereby declared to be a proper subject of comment by
the prosecuting attorney; provided, however, that if such comment
is made by the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument,
without any previous reference thereto having been made in
argument either on behalf of the state or the defendant, the
attorney for the defendant may thereafter, if he so request the
court,
argue upon such comment for such time as the court shall
8
fix. '
The court, in State v. Wolfe, 62 held the provision to be unconstitutional.
However, in a dissenting opinion, Judge Bakewell observed:
If it is moral coercion for a prosecutor to comment on the
obvious fact that the accused has not testified, it is certainly the
very extreme of moral coercion to confront him with his accusers
and tempt him to deny their accusations. All the mechanics of a
criminal trial are a form of moral coercion tending
to force
63
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
Two years after the Wolfe case, the Massachusetts legislature submitted
to the state supreme court for'an advisory opinion a proposed amendment
to its general laws, providing that:
If the defendant fails to testify and if the, court is satisfied at
the close of the evidence that it would be in the power of the
defendant, if not guilty, truthfully to contradict by his testimony
material evidence as to his guilt introduced by the prosecution,
the court may in its discretion instruct the jury that, while the
59a. Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 223 (1871).
60. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
61. S.D. Sess. Laws 1927, ch. 93.
62. 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936).
63. Id. at 194, 266 N.W. at 125.
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prosecution could not have called the defendant as a witness, he
might have elected to be a witness in his own behalf and that in
weighing the evidence it may take into consideration his failure
to testify.
Predicating its advisory opinion on the state's constitutional mandate that
"no subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence
against himself,"64 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, finding the
proposed law to be unconstitutional, held that the defendant's failure to
testify cannot be the basis for any presumptions."
In 1951 the highest court of Louisiana concurred with this argument, 66
saying that:
[Ilf such comment were to be permitted, it would, in effect,
amount to an infringement of the constitutional right of the
accused to abstain from taking the witness stand or to give
testimony in the trial of his own cause. We are fortified in this
view by the fact that in those states where comment obtains,
experience
has shown the defendant is, in fact, pressed to
67
testify.
Any other view would indeed make the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination an idle gesture, for everyone accused of
crime would be faced with the dilemma of being forced to either
take the stand in his own defense or have a inference of guilt attach
merely because he does not do so.68
Aside from, the constitutional argument, a second and perhaps more
realistic argument concerns itself with the danger to the defendant who,
prompted by the "penalty" imposed upon him for refusing to testify,
voluntarily becomes a witness and thereby subjects himself to cross-examination which could expose the defendant's prior convictions of similar
offenses.6 9 While some may say the defendant should acknowledge his
criminal record on direct examination, rather than have it dramatically
elicited from him on cross-examination, it is still quite probable that the
jury would be greatly prejudiced against the person who is revealed as an
"ex-con," especially when the prior offenses were of a similar nature with the
current offense.
Perhaps this second argument is the best answer to the logic of Bentham
and Appleton. It has been said before that Bentham's argument is
irrefutable as long as one presumes that the defendant is guilty, but fails
64. MASS. CONST. pt. I art. 12.
65. In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E.2d 662 (1938).
66. State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So.2d 137 (1951).
67. Id. at 900, 54 So.2d at 141. MCCORMICK § 130 n.40, and 8 WG1MORE 426
point to a survey of the experiences of judges in five states where comment is allowed,
conducted in the 1930's, which revealed that an overwhelming majority of the judges
believed that the allowance of comment had promoted a more just enforcement of
the law.
68. Id. at 901, 54 So.2d at 142.
69. See Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213 (1871).
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when the defendant is presumed to be innocent. 70 However, the possible
motives suggested for the innocent defendant's refusal to testify were, at
best, rather unsubstantial. 7 The dangers of cross-examination in reference
to the defendant's past offenses, conducted under the cloak of impeachment,
furnish the proponents of the "no-comment" rule with a very real and
definite reason for the continuation of the privilege: i.e., unless the scope
of discreditable cross-examination were limited, it would be impossible to
draw any valid inference from the defendant's refusal to testify. 72
CONCLUSION

The principal objection to the initiation of a rule permitting the
prosecution to comment upon the defendant's failure to testify is apparently
based upon the theory that a valid inference of guilt cannot exist since an
innocent defendant may have reason to refuse to testify if he had been
convicted in the past of other crimes (especially where the past convictions
were for offenses similar in nature to the offense charged). It appears
that this objection would have no application in Florida. Under Florida
decisions, when the accused becomes a witness, the prosecutor may crossexamine him as to whether he had been convicted of a criminal offense.
However, he may not be required to disclose the particular crime, unless
it was for perjury.73 Further, a Florida prosecutor may always introduce
evidence of prior crimes committed by the accused to establish the element
of intent or motive. 74 Since the defendant is substantially protected against
being required to reveal the details of his past offenses on cross-examination,
and the prosecution has the right in its affirmative case to introduce the
details of the defendant's past offenses to prove the element of knowledge
or intent, it is difficult to perceive what additional risk the defendant can
possibly face by testifying.
70. 8 WIGMORE § 2251 at 300.

71. MCCORMICK § 132 at 280. If there exists any flaw in this logic, it might
be that an innocent defendant may have other motives, in addition to concealment of
past convictions, which would give him good reason for refusing to testify. Perhaps
the defendant's fear that he would create a bad impression on the jury by his behavior
or appearance on the witness stand, or a desire to protect another person, or some
other possibility would be present.
However, where the risk to the defendant is obscure, or merely fanciful, as
in the case where the defendant fears he would be a 'bad" witness, or is afraid he
would become "rattled" on cross-examination, there could hardly be objection to
compelling the defendant to testify by facing him with the risk of an adverse inference
arising from his refusal to testify.
It seems that any imagined prejudice the defendant may be faced with by taking
the witness stand should be balanced against the value of a full and complete exposure
of all relevant facts which the jury is traditionally entitled to know and consider in the
interest of a fair and just verdict.
72. Both Professors Reader and Bruce, cited note 54 supra, while disagreeing
on the value of the "no-comment" privilege, agree on this point.
73. Steele v. State, 160 Fla. 616, 36 So.2d 212 (1948); 13 FLA. JUR. Evidence
§ 146 (1957).
74. Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959); Zalla v. State, 61 So.2d 649 (Fla.
1952); 13 FLA. JUR. Evidence § 148 (1957).
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In the opinion of this writer, the relative value, if any,, of the
"no-commeht" privilege does 4ofhjustify any further adherence to the rule.
A need for specific legislation :to correct the matter is clearly indicated.
Furthermore, the language used in Gordon v. State75 readily lends itself
to an inference that the Florida Supreme Court would look favorably upon
legislation designed to permit comments on the defendant's refusal to
testify. As a progressive state with a progressive legal system, it seems
appropriate for Florida to now abandon this "rule from the grave."
,

EDwIN C. RATINER

75. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.

